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Abstract—Near Field Communication (NFC) mobile phones
can be used as payment devices and can emulate credit cards.
Although NFC mobile services promise a fruitful future, several
issues have been raised by academics and researchers. Among
the main concerns for the use and deployment of NFC-enabled
mobile phones is the potential loss of security and privacy. More
speciﬁcally, mobile phone users involved in a payment transaction
conducted over a mobile handset require that such a system
does not reveal their identity or any sensitive data. Furthermore,
that all entities participating in the transaction are legitimate.
To this end, we proposed a protocol that meets the mobile user’s
requirements. The proposed protocol attempts to address the
main security concerns and protects the customer privacy from
any third party involved in the transaction. We formally analysed
the protocol using CasperFDR and did not ﬁnd any feasible
attacks.
Index Terms—Security protocol, Privacy, NFC-enabled mobile
phone, Mobile payment
I. INTRODUCTION
An NFC-enabled mobile phone is increasingly becoming a
ubiquitous device allowing access to a wide variety of services
other than making calls and sending texts. NFC is a communi-
cation link that uses Radio Frequency (RF) signals to exchange
data between devices that are normally less than 10 cm [1]. It
can be used in mobile payment transactions just by waving the
NFC-enabled phone at the point of sale (POS) terminal. The
NFC-enabled mobile phone has a secure element, which can
be deﬁned as the main element for securely hosting mobile
applications and their conﬁdential and cryptographic data. [2].
In this paper we focus on a mobile payment, which can
be deﬁned as any payment that involves a mobile phone to
initiate, authorise and conﬁrm an exchange of ﬁnancial value
in return for goods and services [3].
A number of mobile payment studies have been proposed
in recent years, for example utilising Short Message Service
(SMS) [4], bluetooth [5], [6], or NFC technology. However,
using SMS for making a mobile payment might be vulnerable
to exploits of SMS latency [8]. In addition, using a bluetooth
as a communication mode can be compromised by a new
attack known as snarﬁng, which allows the intruder to exploit
a security ﬂaw in the wireless protocol [7]. One of the most
well-known NFC mobile payment applications among Android
devices is Google Wallet. Google Wallet is a container for bank
cards, gift cards, reward cards and special offers. The user has
to provide a PIN number to unlock the application, choose the
payment card and then place the phone on the POS terminal to
make the payment. However, Ronald et al. shows that Google
Wallet can be vulnerable to relay attack; a detailed attack can
be found in [9].
There is less literature related to authenticating all of
the parties involved in a shop-based NFC mobile payment
transaction, which will be the focus of this paper. Moreover,
this study will also concentrate on maintaining privacy of the
customer’s identity and sensitive data such as bank account.
A simple scenario which this paper is based on is shown
in Fig. I. It works as follows: 1- The customer needs to scan
the products’ tags by using his NFC-enabled mobile phone.
2- The customer presents his phone to the merchant’s reader
(POS). 3- The reader contacts the issuer bank for making a
payment of the purchased products.
Fig. 1. System model
Mobile phone users involved in a payment transaction con-
ducted over a mobile handset require that such a system does
not reveal their identity or any sensitive data. Furthermore,
that all entities participating in the transaction are legitimate.
To achieve this, the proposed mobile payment in this paper
involves three stages:
1) In the ﬁrst stage, we propose to authenticate the prod-
ucts’ tags to the merchant’s reader (POS).
2) In the second stage, we propose to provide a mutual
authentication between the customer’s phone and the
merchant’s reader.
3) In the third stage, we propose to authenticate the cus-
tomer, customer’s phone and merchant’s reader to the
bank, and vice versa.
Moreover, to achieve privacy to the customer’s sensitive
data, our proposed protocol exhibits the following:
• Customer privacy: The customers who wish to use their
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mobile phones for making a payment, are not required
to submit any card details. They just need to know the
bank application PIN number and be in possession of
the mobile phone. Also, the merchant never receives any
bank card data; instead, they receive an encrypted and
signed credit card certiﬁcate.
We propose to employ a one-time password (OTP) mecha-
nism within the NFC-enabled mobile phone for the authen-
tication purpose. OTP is a single use password, hence an
intercepted password will not be reusable. One way to generate
an OTP in the NFC-enabled mobile phone is via a smart card
such as the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC). An
UICC smart card is used as the secure element that provides
a tamper-resistant storage of cryptographic keys and performs
cryptographic operations [10].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
introduces the main motivation for proposing our protocol.
Section III shows the scenario for making a mobile payment
in a shop. In Section IV, the protocol’s main goals and
requirements are discussed. In Section V, we explain the
proposed protocol in detail. In Section VI, we show some
diverse scenarios and analyse the proposed protocol with
respect to informal analysis. In Section VII, we formally
analyse the proposed protocol using CasperFDR. Finally, in
Section VIII, we provide the concluding remarks.
II. MOTIVATION
We proposed this scheme mainly to solve the problems
with using a smart card that utilises the Europay-Mastercard-
Visa (EMV) standards for making a payment. The EMV
standards were developed to overcome weaknesses found in
the magnetic stripe card and to provide more security to the
payment applications [11]. The so-called “EMV Chip and
PIN” protects smart card transactions by authenticating the
card, cardholder and transaction through a combination of
cryptographic functions, and the entry of a PIN [12]. However,
it has been found that the security provided by the EMV in
the smart card can be vulnerable to bypassing, downgrading
or cloning attacks as listed in [13]–[15].
In [13], the authors show that the PIN veriﬁcation process
can be compromised by an attacker, who can use a genuine
stolen card to make a payment without knowing the card’s
PIN, and the transaction will be successful only if the card
supports the “ofﬂine plaintext PIN cardholder veriﬁcation”
option. This happens because in this mode, the terminal asks
the cardholder to enter the PIN, and then the PIN is sent from
the terminal to the card in plaintext to ﬁnd a match with the
card’s stored PIN.
Moreover, the authors in [14] show that an attacker can
downgrade the Cardholder Veriﬁcation Method (CVM) list
from “encrypted PIN cardholder veriﬁcation” to “plaintext PIN
cardholder veriﬁcation” using a dedicated skimming hardware
that can capture the card data and record the entered PIN.
Also, an attacker could modify the Issuer Action Code, which
affects how the terminal should react in case of an exception.
The attacker can change the action code to be “in case of
a failed data authentication, authorise the transaction online”.
Therefore, although the transaction can be detected and denied
at the back-end, the PIN will be transferred to the card in
plaintext, which can then be intercepted by the attacker.
Furthermore, Bond et al. in [15] show that an attacker can
predict the random number generated by the terminal and can
resend the authorisation request cryptogram (ARQC) to the
issuer to appears as if the card is alive, present, and engaged
in the transaction. ARQC is a description of the transaction
details, such as transaction amount, currency, type, a nonce
generated by the terminal, etc. Due to the predictability of
the random number, the attacker could calculate a series of
ARQCs and compare them with a real credit card in advance.
Later, the attacker can clone a card using these pre-calculated
ARQCs to perform actual payment transactions.
One of the main problems that exists with the EMV standard
is that the attacker can tamper with the terminal, such as the
POS or the ATM, in order to steal the card’s PIN or to clone a
legitimate card. This motivated us to propose a new protocol
that authenticates the terminal to the other parties involved in
the communication session before accomplishing subsequent
tasks.
Instead of using a physical card for making a payment, a
contactless payment system, where the card data is stored
in the mobile’s secure element, is introduced. One of the
most global contactless payment card standards is the EMV
Contactless Speciﬁcations for Payment Systems [16], which
is based on the ISO/IEC14443 standard. However, using a
wireless NFC technology may simplify some attacks, such as
eavesdropping and relay attacks [9]. For example, Francis et
al. [17] showed that NFC-enabled mobile phones can be used
as platforms for attacks against ISO/IEC 14443-based smart
card systems. The authors showed that an attacker with an
NFC phone can perform two attacks, namely token cloning
and contactless skimming. In addition, Francis et al. [18]
demonstrated that an attacker can cause a relay attack in the
peer-to-peer NFC communication mode via installing suitable
MIDlets on the attacker’s own NFC-enabled phones.
III. SCENARIO
The proposed approach can be used in a shop, such as a
clothes shop, as follows:
1) A group of brands or products share the same NFC tag.
This tag can be placed on the shelf edge in front of the
products. The customer uses his NFC-enabled mobile
phone to scan the product’s NFC tag.
2) The phone displays the product’s information, such as its
ID and price. If the customer wants to buy the product,
he clicks on the Approve button, otherwise he clicks on
the Cancel button. The customer does the same process
with all the products he wants to purchase.
3) If the customer wants to delete an item after approving
it, from the list of selected products he just clicks on the
unwanted item and clicks on the Delete button.
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4) When the customer ﬁnishes scanning the products’ tags,
he places his phone close to the NFC reader (POS).
5) The reader displays the total price to the customer.
6) The customer clicks on the OK button to conﬁrm.
7) The bank application in the phone asks the customer to
enter the application’s PIN on the mobile phone.
8) The customer enters the bank application’s PIN.
9) The customer brings his phone close to the reader.
10) The transaction result is displayed on the reader, stored
in the merchant database, and the bill is sent to the
mobile phone (in both successful or failed transaction).
IV. GOALS
In this section we consider the main requirements for every
party involved in the mobile payment process, namely a bank,
a merchant and a customer.
1) The issuer bank requires the following:
• Customer and mobile phone authentication: The
bank needs to authenticate the customer and his
mobile phone before debiting his account.
• Merchant authentication: Before the bank debits the
customer’s account, it needs to have a proof that a
legitimate merchant has requested this transaction.
2) The merchant requires the following:
• Scanned products authentication: The merchant
should authenticate all the products scanned by the
customer before proceeding with the transaction.
• Customer’s phone authentication: The merchant
needs to ensure that it deals with a mobile phone
belongs to a legitimate customer, not an attacker
impersonating the customer.
• Bank authentication: The issuer bank should authen-
ticate itself to the merchant, so that the merchant
knows it is dealing with a legitimate bank.
• Transaction authentication: The merchant should
receive a conﬁrmation from the bank about the
status of the transaction.
3) The customer requires the following:
• Customer data privacy: The protocol should protect
the customer’s identity, such as the phone number
and/or sensitive data, such as the customer’s bank
account from being revealed by the merchant or
intruders.
• Bank authentication: The customer’s phone should
conﬁrm that it is dealing with a legitimate issuer
bank, who issued the stored customer’s card.
• Merchant authentication: The customer’s phone
should conﬁrm that it is dealing with a legitimate
merchant’s reader, not a spoofed reader.
• Transaction authentication: The customer should
receive a bill which shows if the transaction is
successful or not.
V. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we explain the proposed protocol in detail.
A. Notation
Ti: Denotes the ith product’s tag
P: Denotes a mobile phone
M: Denotes a merchant
B: Denotes an issuer bank
AC: Denotes an acquiring bank
KPx: A public key of entity x of L bits (e.g. L=128 bits),
used for encryption
KSx: A private key of entity x of L bits (e.g. L=128 bits),
used for decryption
KSGx: A private key of entity x of L bits (e.g. L=128 bits),
used for signing the data
Kxy: A shared session secret key between two entities x and
y of L bits (e.g. L=128 bits)
EKxy (M): A message M encrypted with a shared session
secret key (symmetric encryption)
EKPx (M): A message M encrypted with a public key
(asymmetric encryption)
SigKSGx (Z): A signature on data Z, signed using x private
key
MSISDN: The Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital
Network Number (mobile phone number)
Certx: A digital certiﬁcate of an entity x, i.e.
Certx=SigKSGCA(KPx, expiry date, IDx), where KSGCA
is the Certiﬁcation Authority private key.
Card-CerP : A bank card digital certiﬁcate calculated by the
issuer bank, i.e. Card-CerP=EKPP (SigKSGB (customer name,
account number, MSISDN, KPP , expiry date))
HPIN: The result of applying hash function on the mobile
phone banking application PIN number
TMSI: The Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
IDx: The ID that uniquely identiﬁes entity x
Rx: A fresh random number generated by entity x
H(Z) : The result of generating a hash of data Z, where H:
{0,1}∗ → {0,1}L
d: The number of scanned products
n: The number of products in the shop
Tprice: The total price of the purchased items
TREF: The transaction reference generated by the merchant
B. Assumption
In designing the proposed protocol we assume the follow-
ing:
• The issuer bank calculates Card-CerP for a customer’s
mobile phone and stores it in the bank.
• The customer installed the mobile phone banking appli-
cation. The application is stored in the secure element.
The customer cannot tamper with the application as it is
installed in the secure element, which is isolated from the
phone’s main operating system and hardware.
• Only the legitimate issuer bank can access the mobile
phone banking application and store Card-CerP and IDB
via the Mobile Network Operator (MNO), which provides
the bank with a unique security key to manage its
application within the secure element.
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• The mobile phone banking application asks the customer
during installation to enter a new PIN for the application.
Once entered, the UICC calculates the hash of PIN
denoted as (HPIN) and stores it in the secure element.
The UICC calculates Password=EKPB (SigKSGP (HPIN))
using bank public key (KPB) and phone’s private key
used for signature (KSGP ), and transmits it to the issuer
bank along with phone’s certiﬁcate (CertP ) via the MNO.
The bank decrypts Password using the bank’s private key,
veriﬁes the signature using the phone’s public key and
stores (HPIN) and CertP associated with the customer’s
stored data.
• The communication channel between the merchant and
issuer bank is secure (for example using HTTPs).
• The mobile phone communicates with the product’s tag
and the merchant’s reader through a wireless channel that
is vulnerable to attacks.
• The product’s NFC tags in the proposed scheme is
applicable to NFC Type-4 tags that supports ISO 7816-4
and therefore contain a cryptographic processor, which
can compute symmetric key encryption [19].
• The ith product’s NFC tag (Ti) is encoded by the mer-
chant with some data, such as IDM , IDTi and pricei.
These data are also stored in the merchant database.
• The ith product’s NFC tag (Ti) also stores a shared
session secret key with the merchant (M) denoted as
(KTiM ).
• The issuer bank contacts the acquiring bank via existing
architectures and is generally considered to be secure.
• The best practices should be used to ensure that the
mobile phone is a trustworthy device; for instance, take
the advantages of using a trusted secure element and a
secure processor.
• Each product embeds a Radio Frequency IDentiﬁcation
(RFID) UHF tag as shown in Section VI.
C. Protocol Description
The proposed protocol contains three stages, namely issuing
phase, authentication phase and payment phase.
• Issuing Phase
This stage occurs when the customer scans the products
he wants to buy through the NFC-enabled phone, which
acts as a reader. This stage is shown in Table I. It involves
the following steps:
1) The customer should make sure that his device has
the NFC function turned ON. The customer scans
the product’s NFC tag with his mobile phone. The
product’s tag sends the price to the phone.
2) The mobile phone displays the price to the customer.
If the customer wants to buy the product, he clicks
on the Approve button, otherwise he clicks on the
Cancel button.
3) If the customer clicked the Approve button, the
secure element generates a random number RTi .
4) The phone sends RTi to the tag.
5) The ith tag calculates Di =EKTiM (IDTi , IDM , RTi ).
6) The tag sends Di, IDTi , and pricei to the phone.
7) The phone displays the product’s ID and price to
the customer. Simultaneously, the phone stores Di,
pricei and RTi in the secure element to be used in
the authentication phase.
This process is repeated for each product the customer
wishes to buy. Finally, the secure element calculates the
total price (Tprice) of the scanned products and stores it.
• Authentication Phase
Given a successful scanning process from the previous
phase, the merchant’s reader needs to authenticate the
products’ tags and mutually authenticate the customer’s
phone. This phase is shown in Table II. It involves the
following steps:
1) The customer presents his phone close to the mer-
chant’s reader (POS).
2) The phone sends its certiﬁcate (CertP ) along with
the TMSI to the reader. TMSI is a temporary
identiﬁcation number to ensure the privacy of the
mobile subscriber [20]. It remains ﬁxed until the
device connects to a base station controlled by a
different Visitor Location Register (VLR). TMSI
serves as a temporary phone ID.
3) The reader veriﬁes the phone’s certiﬁcate (CertP ).
4) The reader obtains the phone’s public key (KPP )
from CertP .
5) There is no shared secret between the reader and
the mobile device until this stage. Thus, the reader
generates a fresh random number as a secret session
key between the reader and the phone, denoted as
(KMP ). This key is used for subsequent encryption
between the merchant’s reader and the phone.
6) The reader signs the session key with the merchant’s
signature private key, and then encrypts the signa-
ture with the phone’s public key, i.e.
M1=EKPP (SigKSGM (KMP , IDM , TMSI)). The in-
clusion of IDM and TMSI ensures that both princi-
pals have knowledge of each other’s identity.
7) The reader sends M1, and IDM to the phone along
with the merchant’s certiﬁcate (CertM ).
8) The secure element veriﬁes the merchant’s certiﬁ-
cate (CertM ).
9) The secure element obtains the merchant’s public
key (KPM ) from CertM .
10) The secure element decrypts M1 using its secret key
(KSP ). Then, it checks the signature using the ob-
tained merchant’s public key from CertM to conﬁrm
that the message comes from a legitimate merchant.
Then, the secure element veriﬁes the authenticity of
the the data received from the reader, such as IDM
and TMSI. Moreover, the secure element veriﬁes
425
TABLE I
ISSUING PHASE
Mobile phone NFC product
1- Scan the product
2- Display the price
3- If Approve, generate RTi
4-RTi−−−−−−−−−→
5- Calculate Di =EKTiM (IDTi , IDM , RTi )
6-Di,IDTi ,pricei←−−−−−−−−−
7- Display IDTi and pricei, and store Di and RTi in UICC
that the session secret key (KMP ) is fresh if the
TMSI has not been changed in order to prevent
replay attack. If this process is successful, the secure
element authenticates the reader.
11) The secure element sends all the data received
from the products’ tags to the reader to be authen-
ticated by calculating M2=EKMP (SigKSGP (IDM ,
IDB , TMSI, D1 ... Dd)) using the secure element’s
signature private key, and the shared session key.
The inclusion of IDB is to inform the reader about
the identity of the issuer bank.
12) The phone sends M2 and RT1 ... RTd (from Step 3
in the issuing phase) to the reader.
13) The reader decrypts M2 using the shared session
key, then checks the signature using the obtained
phone’s public key to conﬁrm that the message
comes from a legitimate phone. If this process
is successful, the reader authenticates the mobile
phone.
14) Now, the reader attempts to authenticate the prod-
ucts’ tags by decrypting D1 ... Dd using the shared
secret keys (KT1M ... KTdM ) previously known
to the reader. Then. the reader compares the data
within D1 ... Dd with the data previously stored
in the database during the encoding phase. If this
process is successful, the reader authenticates the
scanned products.
15) The reader retrieves the price values from the
database associated with the received ID1 ... IDd,
and then calculates the total price (Tprice).
16) The reader sends Tprice to the customer’s phone.
17) The secure element compares the received value
of Tprice from the reader with the stored value of
Tprice calculated by the phone in the issuing phase.
If there is a match, the phone displays the total price
value to the customer.
18) The customer reviews the price and clicks the OK
button to conﬁrm. If the customer wants to cancel a
purchased item, he goes back to the products list on
the phone and presses the Delete button. The phone
recalculates M2 by omitting the deleted item (Di)
and resends it to the reader.
• Payment Phase
If the authentication between the merchant, mobile phone
and products’ tags is achieved in the previous phase,
the customer phone is now ready to perform a mobile
payment process. This phase is shown in Table III. It
involves the following:
1) Based on the received value of IDB , the reader
starts the connection with the issuer bank. The
reader generates a transaction reference number
(TREF) that should be unique for each transaction,
then calculates M3=EKPB (SigKSGM (TREF, Tprice,
IDM , IDB , CertP )). The inclusion of IDM and IDB
ensures that both principals have knowledge of each
other’s identity.
2) The reader sends CertM , and M3 to the issuer bank
via the Internet.
3) The bank veriﬁes the merchant’s certiﬁcate (CertM )
and obtains the merchant’s public key (KPM ) and
IDM .
4) The bank decrypts M3 using its secret key (KSB),
then checks the signature using the obtained mer-
chant’s public key from CertM to conﬁrm that the
message comes from a legitimate merchant. Then,
the bank veriﬁes the authenticity of the data received
from the reader, such as IDM and IDB . The bank
checks that TREF is unique and has never been
received before from this merchant. If this process
is successful, the bank authenticates the reader and
stores TREF and Tprice.
5) The bank compares the received phone’s certiﬁcate
(CertP ) with the stored certiﬁcate and obtains the
phone’s public key (KPP ).
6) The bank generates a fresh random number as a
challenge between the bank and the phone to be
used in the calculation of the session key.
7) The bank signs the challenge with its private
key, and then encrypts the signature with the
phone’s public key, i.e. M4=EKPP (SigKSGB (IDB ,
challenge).
8) The bank calculates M5= EKPM (SigKSGB (IDB ,
IDM , TREF) to be authenticated by the merchant.
9) The bank sends M4, M5 and IDB to the merchant.
10) The merchant decrypts M5 using its private key
(KSM ) and veriﬁes the bank’s signature using the
bank’s public key (KPB). The merchant veriﬁes
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TABLE II
AUTHENTICATION PHASE
Mobile phone NFC reader
1- The phone is presented to the reader
2-CertP ,TMSI−−−−−−−−−→
3- Verify CertP
4- Obtain KPP from CertP
5- Generate KMP
6- Calculate M1=EKPP (SigKSGM (KMP , IDM , TMSI))
7-M1,IDM ,CertM←−−−−−−−−−
8- Verify CertM
9- Obtain KPM from CertM
10-Decrypt M1, check the signature
and verify the authenticity of the the received data
11- Calculate
M2=EKMP (SigKSGP (IDM , IDB , TMSI, D1 ... Dd))
12-M2,RT1 ... RTd−−−−−−−−−→
13- Decrypt M2, then check the signature
14- Decrypt D1 ... Dd, verify the signatures,
then verify the authenticity of the the received data
15- Retrieve the price values from the database,
then calculate Tprice
16-Tprice←−−−−−−−−−
17- Compare the received value of
Tprice with the stored value of Tprice
18- The customer reviews the total price and clicks the OK
button to conﬁrm
the authenticity of the data (IDB , IDM , TREF)
within M5. If this process is successful, the reader
authenticates the bank.
11) The merchant sends M4 and CertB to the phone.
12) The secure element veriﬁes the bank’s certiﬁcate
(CertB) and retrieves the bank’s public key (KPB)
and IDB .
13) The secure element decrypts M4 using its private
key, then checks the signature using the obtained
bank’s public key from CertB to conﬁrm that the
message comes from the bank. The secure element
authenticates the data (IDB) within the signature
with the stored one. If this process is successful,
the phone authenticates the bank.Then, the secure
element retrieves the challenge.
14) The phone asks the customer to enter the payment
application PIN on the mobile phone. The customer
enters the PIN on the payment application in the
mobile phone, then clicks on the OK button.
15) The customer brings his phone close to the reader.
16) The secure element calculates the hash of the en-
tered PIN and veriﬁes it with the HPIN stored in
the secure element. If the HPIN is veriﬁed, the se-
cure element generates a one-time password, which
serves as a session secret key, i.e. KBP=H(HPIN
⊕ challenge). This step is necessary to authenticate
the customer to the bank.
17) The secure element calculates
M6=EKBP (SigKSGP (MSISDN, IDB , Tprice,
Card-CerP )). The inclusion of both the IDB and
the MSISDN ensures that both principals have
knowledge of each other’s identity. The calculation
of M6 is necessary to authenticate the customer via
the entered PIN and to verify the signature of the
phone and hence authenticate them.
18) The phone sends M6 and TMSI to the merchant’s
reader.
19) The reader sends M6 and TMSI to the bank.
20) The bank retrieves the customer’s HPIN from the
database (which should be associated with the
phone’s certiﬁcate (CertP )) and calculates the ses-
sion key, i.e. KBP=H(HPIN ⊕ challenge), then
decrypts M6 using (KBP ). If the bank successfully
generated the correct session key, veriﬁed the signa-
ture, and authenticated the data, such as MSISDN
and IDB , then the bank authenticates the customer
and phone. Later, the bank compares the Tprice
values it received from the merchant and phone,
and if there is a match, the bank withdraws the total
price from the customer’s account.
21) To inform the merchant that the trans-
action is completed, the bank calculates
M7=EKPM (SigKSGB (IDM , IDB , TMSI,
Transaction-result)) i.e. Transaction-result= (Tprice,
TREF, Transaction-status). Transaction-result is
stored in the bank for further acknowledgment.
22) The bank sends M7 to the merchant reader.
23) The merchant decrypts M7 using its secret key
(KSM ) and veriﬁes the bank’s signature. The mer-
chant veriﬁes the authenticity of the data within M7.
24) The reader displays Tprice and Transaction-status
on the screen.
25) The reader sends the Bill to the phone.
26) The phone displays the Bill to the customer.
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TABLE IV
DATA STORAGE
Product Tag NFC Mobile Phone Merchant Bank
KTiM , IDM , IDTi ,
Pricei
KSP , KPP , CertP ,
MSISDN, TMSI, Card-
CerP , IDB , HPIN
KSM , KPM , KT1M
... KTnM , CertM ,
IDM , ID1 ... IDn,
price1...pricen
KSB , KPB , CertB ,
IDB , Card-CerP , CertP ,
MSISDN, HPIN
27) The ﬁnal step is to contact the acquiring bank. The
merchant sends an authorisation request, i.e. M8=
EKPAC (SigKSGM (IDM , IDAC , Transaction-result)),
to the acquiring bank. Once the acquiring bank
authorises the merchant, it contacts the issuer bank
and sends an authorisation request along with the
Transaction-result. The authorisation and authenti-
cation between the issuer and acquiring banks is
beyond the scope of this paper.
28) For further security, once the transaction is suc-
cessful, the RFID reader should disable the RFID
tags attached to each purchased product that are
placed on the basket contactlessly by sending the
Kill command as shown in the Speciﬁcation [21].
The Kill command length should be long enough to
prevent a brute force attack (for example, 128 bits).
The details of this process can be found in [21].
The data stored in each party is shown in Table IV:
VI. INFORMAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL
The protocol has been designed with respect to a number
of possible attacks which are examined in this section.
1) Stolen mobile phone: If the customer presents a stolen
mobile phone, the mobile phone banking application
PIN would prevent this from being useful as the at-
tacker would not know the application PIN. The attacker
will not be able to obtain the application PIN during
messages exchanged as the PIN is not transmitted in
clear. Moreover, the bank application PIN is not stored
in the secure element, only the hash of the PIN (HPIN)
is stored in the secure element.
2) Observed response: An attacker may attempt to eaves-
drop on a session between the mobile phone and mer-
chant’s reader and capture the exchanged messages.
Then, in the next session, the attacker’s phone re-
sends the captured messages to charge purchases to
the victim’s account for example. However, the OTP
mechanism for generating the session key between the
phone and merchant (KMP ) and between the phone and
bank (KBP ) is used within only one session, and they
cannot be reused when the session ends. Best practices
must be used for generating the session keys.
3) Scanning a cheap product’s tag instead of an expensive
product’s tag: An attacker may choose an expensive item
but scan a tag attached to a cheap item. However, the
RFID reader placed near the gate should detect such an
attack as the expensive item’s RFID tag has not been
disabled by the RFID reader, thus causing alarm. An
attacker will not be able to disable the RFID tag as he
needs to send Kill command which depends on a kill
password only known by the reader and RFID tag.
4) Fault scanning: An attacker might attempt to purchase
two identical items but scan the NFC tag only once
to pay for only one item. However, the gate’s reader
will detect that there is an extra item that has not been
disabled by the RFID reader.
Moreover, the proposed protocol meets the main require-
ments discussed in Section IV as follows:
• Customer privacy: The privacy of the customer is pro-
vided by not sending his identity, such as mobile phone
number (MSISDN) or his bank account data, to a mer-
chant. The merchant only receives the TMSI, which is
a temporary number associated with the mobile phone.
Moreover, the customer’s bank account certiﬁcate cannot
be disclosed to the merchant, as it is encrypted by the
session key (KBP ) only known to the phone and bank.
• Unilateral authentication between merchant and product:
Each tag associated with a group of products is pro-
grammed to encrypt its data using the shared session key
between the tag and reader (KTiM ), thus only a legal
reader with the shared key can decrypt the tag’s data.
• Mutual authentication between the mobile phone and
merchant’s reader: The merchant authenticates the mo-
bile phone, and vice versa, via three entities:
– Entity digital certiﬁcate (Certp, CertM )
– Shared session key (KMP )
– Entity digital signature (KSGx)
• Mutual authentication between the merchant’s reader and
bank: The merchant and bank are mutually authenticated
via two entities:
– Entity digital certiﬁcate (CertM , CertB)
– Entity digital signature (KSGx)
• Mutual authentication between the mobile phone and
bank: The phone and bank are mutually authenticated
via three entities:
– Entity digital certiﬁcate (Certp, CertB)
– Shared session key (KBP ), which is based on the
customer’s HPIN and bank’s challenge.
– Entity digital signature (KSGx)
• Mobile phone holder’s authorisation: In our protocol the
customer is authorised for making a mobile payment by
entering the bank’s application PIN, which is checked by
the phone’s secure element and the bank database.
• Merchant’s reader impersonation attack: The attacker
(M') might be able to impersonate a legitimate reader,
generate a session key (KM ′P ) and send a forged mes-
sage to the phone ex. M1'=EKPP (SigKSM′ (KM ′P , IDM ,
TMSI)) with the real reader certiﬁcate (CertM ). However,
the secure element will detect such an attack by verifying
the signature of the data as they are signed by the attacker
not by the legitimate reader.
• Man in the middle attack: It is essentially difﬁcult for
an attacker operating between the sender and receiver to
manipulate the exchanged messages, add new messages,
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TABLE III
PAYMENT PHASE
Mobile phone NFC reader Issuer bank
1- Generate TREF, then calculate
M3=EKPB (SigKSGM (TREF,
Tprice, IDM , IDB , CertP ))
2-CertM ,M3−−−−−−−−−→
3- Decrypt M3
4- Generate a challenge
5- Calculate
M4=EKPP (SigKSGB (IDB ,
challenge)
6- Calculate M5=
EKPM (SigKSGB (IDB , IDM ,
TREF)
7- M4,M5,IDB←−−−−−−−−−
8- Decrypt M5
9-M4,CertB←−−−−−−−−−
10- Decrypt M4
11- The customer enters the PIN on the
mobile phone, then clicks on
the OK button
12- The customer brings his phone
close to the reader
13- Calculate HPIN, and calculate
KBP =H(PIN ⊕ challenge)
14- Calculate
M6=EKBP (SigKSGP (MSISDN,
IDB , Tprice, Card-CerP ))
15-M6, TMSI−−−−−−−−−→
16-M6, TMSI−−−−−−−−−→
17- Calculate
KBP =H(HPIN ⊕ challenge),
then decrypt M6
18- Calculate
M7=EKPM (SigKSGB (IDM ,
IDB , TMSI, Transaction-result))
19-M7←−−−−−−−−−
20- Decrypt M7
21- Display the transaction results
on the terminal
23-Bill←−−−−−−−−− 22- Prepare the Bill
24- Display the Bill to the customer
or modify legitimate messages due to the close distance
between the sender and receiver [22]. Also, all the ex-
changed messages are signed and encrypted, which create
no meaning to the attacker.
• Relay attack: According to [9], there are some potential
solutions to avoid relay attacks, such as verifying the
PIN within the application in the secure element and
displaying the total amount to the customer for conﬁr-
mation. In our protocol, the PIN is veriﬁed within the
bank application installed on the secure element. Hence,
the attacker will need to know the customer’s PIN to
conduct a successful relay attack. Also, the customer’s
mobile phone shows the total price of the transaction and
allows the customers to detect if they are being charged
for more than expected.
• Replay attack: The attacker will not be able to resend
the previously exchanged messages as they incorporates
a fresh random number (RTi ) or session keys such as
KMP and KBP that can be used only once. Moreover,
there are some data for which their values will be changed
after each session, such as TMSI, TREF, challenge and
Transaction-result.
• Predicting the random numbers: The proposed scheme
should deploy best practices to generate random numbers
that are difﬁcult to predict, such us utilising a hardware
random number generator.
• Non-repudiation: In this paper, a digital signature is used
to ensure that a message has been electronically signed
by an entity x, and to ensure that entity x cannot later
deny that he created the signature.
• Usability: The proposed solution suggests that the user
only needs his phone to make the payment. Mobile
phones are ubiquitous devices that can be hardly con-
sidered a burden to carry. The user has only to touch
his phone to the reader and enter the application’s PIN,
which is rather easy and coherent from the user’s point
429
of view.
VII. FORMAL ANALYSIS USING CASPERFDR
Gavin Lowe has developed the CasperFDR tool [23], a
tool for checking the soundness of the protocol based on the
speciﬁed requirements. It takes a high-level description of the
protocol together with its security requirements and produces
a Communicating Sequential Process (CSP) code checked and
veriﬁed by Failure-Divergence Reﬁnement (FDR).
To verify the protocol formally and provide indicative result,
we prepared a CasperFDR input ﬁle, but due to the page limit
we show only the payment phase protocol in Appendix A.
CasperFDR is used to verify the authentication and secrecy re-
quirements of the protocol. The main data, keys and functions
are deﬁned in the #Free variables Section. In the #Protocol
description Section, we described the main steps for sending
and receiving messages between the the phone, merchant’s
reader and bank. At the beginning of the #Protocol description
Section, we assume that all the parties contact the Certiﬁcation
Authority server (s) to retrieve the digital certiﬁcate of each
entity, namely digA, digB, and digM.
The requirements are deﬁned in the #Speciﬁcation Section.
One form of authentication used in the script is Agreement.
Agreement means that if Bob meets the Agreement speci-
ﬁcation, he conﬁrms that Alice has run the same protocol,
and agreed on the exchanged values. For example, Agreement
(b,a,[HPIN, Challenge, IDB]) means that the phone (b) is
authenticated to the bank (a) and both parties agreed on the
data values (HPIN, Challenge, IDB).
Similarly, secrecy is speciﬁed using the requirement Secret,
which checks whether the intruder could know the secret
value at the end of the protocol. For instance, Secret (a,
passwd(HPIN,Challenge), [b]) means that the secret session
key (passwd(HPIN,Challenge)) should only be known to the
bank (a) and phone (b).
According to the script in Appendix A, the following goals
are achieved as follow:
• Mutual authentication: Before the merchant sends M3
and digM, it performs Running.m.a.[IDM, IDB, TREF,
digB] event, which means the merchant starts a run
of the protocol, apparently with the bank agreeing on
data. Later, the bank will perform Commit.a.m.[IDM,
IDB, TREF, digB] event at the end of its part of
the protocol, which means the server has ﬁnished the
protocol with the merchant agreeing on the received
data. Similarly, before the bank sends M4 and M5, it
performs Running.a.b.[IDB, HPIN, Challenge, MSISDN]
and Running.a.m.[IDB, IDM, TREF] respectively, and
when the tag receives M4, it performs Commit.b.a.[IDB,
HPIN, Challenge, MSISDN], and the merchant performs
Commit.m.a.[IDB, IDM, TREF].
• Tag anonymity is depicted as Claim Secret.a.b.Challenge,
Claim Secret.a.b.passwd(HPIN,Challenge) and
Claim Secret.a.b.HPIN events, which means that
the three values of Challenge, passwd(HPIN,Challenge)
and HPIN should be kept secret between the mobile
phone and the bank.
• Resistance to replay attack is illustrated as a scenario
where the phone is engaging in the protocol twice. The
phone ﬁrstly runs the protocol with the bank, and the
intruder obtains M6. Then, the intruder runs the protocol
with the same bank and resends M6 to the bank via the
merchant’s reader. The bank will not perform the Commit
event as it received the same session key. Similarly,
if the phone engages in the protocol run by receiving
duplicate messages from the intruder or the bank, it will
not perform the Running event.
In addition, in the #Intruder information section, the intruder
is deﬁned to be Mallory, who can take full control of the
session: he can impersonate any entity in the protocol, read
the messages transmitted in the network, intercept, analyse,
and/or modify messages.
CasperFDR did not ﬁnd any feasible attacks on the proposed
protocol, which means that the proposed protocol successfully
authenticates all the entities and at the same time ensures that
the secret data are kept secure between the legitimate entities.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed to use an NFC-enabled mobile
phone for making a secure mobile payment that tackles the
issues such as card cloning, skimming, downgrading the termi-
nal and relay attacks. The proposed work focuses on mutually
authenticating the customer, mobile phone, merchant’s reader
and bank before proceeding with the secure payment. The
protocol uses the OTP to generate secret session keys that
encrypt the customer’s data; hence preserve tag’s data privacy
and provide mutual authentication. We presented an initial
informal analysis and we formally analysed the protocol to
provide some indicative results. Based on the results of the
analysis, we found that it relatively meets the security and
privacy requirements that shape the customer and organisation
demands. We are planning to implement the proposed protocol
and verify its privacy and security features using another
formal analysis tool such as Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA).
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A: CASPERFDR SCRIPT
-- NFC PAYMENT PHASE PROTOCOL
-- Not all the data are included in the script
for simplicity
#Free variables
a, b, m : Agent
-- a= bank b= phone m=merchant
s : Server
Challenge, TREF : Nonce
IDB, IDM, HPIN, MSISDN : Data
pk : Agent -> PubKey
sk : Agent -> SecKey
pks : ServerPublicKey
sks : ServerSecretKey
passwd : Data x Nonce -> Password
InverseKeys = (passwd, passwd), (pk, sk),
(pks, sks)
#Processes
BANK(a,s,m, b, IDB, Challenge, pks, HPIN,
IDM, MSISDN) knows sk(a), pk(a), pk, passwd(HPIN,
Challenge)
PHONE(b, s, a, IDB, pks, HPIN, MSISDN) knows
sk(b), pk(b), pk, passwd(HPIN,Challenge)
SERVER(s, a, b, m, pks, sks) knows pk(a),
pk(b), pk(m)
MERCHANT(m , s, a, IDB, IDM, TREF)
knows pk(m), sk(m), pk
#Protocol description
0. -> m : a
1a. s -> a : {a, pk(a)}{sks} % digA
1b. s -> b : {b, pk(b)}{sks} % digB
1c. s -> m : {a, pk(a)}{sks} % digA,
{b, pk(b)}{sks} % digB,
{m, pk(m)}{sks} % digM
2a. m -> a : digM % {m, pk(m)}{sks}
2b. m -> a: { {IDM, IDB, TREF,
digB % {b, pk(b)}{sks}}{sk(m)}}{pk(a)} -- M3
3a. a -> m :{{ IDB,Challenge}{sk(a)}}{pk(b)}% M4 -- M4
3b. a -> m: { {IDB, IDM, TREF}{sk(a)}}{pk(m)} -- M5
4. -> m: b
5a. m -> b : digA % {a, pk(a)}{sks}
5b. m -> b:M4%{{ IDB,Challenge}{sk(a)}}{pk(b)}
6. b -> m : { {IDB, MSISDN}{sk(b)} }{passwd(HPIN,
Challenge)} % M6 -- M6
7. m -> a:M6%{{IDB}{sk(b)}}{passwd(HPIN,Challenge)}
8. a -> m : {{IDM, IDB, TREF}{sk(a)}}{pk(m)} -- M7
#Specification
Secret(a, passwd(HPIN,Challenge), [b])
Secret(a, Challenge, [b])
Secret(a, HPIN, [b])
Agreement(b,a,[HPIN, Challenge, IDB, MSISDN])
Agreement(a,m,[IDB, IDM, TREF])
#Actual variables
Phone, Bank, Merchant, Mallory : Agent
Server1: Server
Challenge1, TREF1 : Nonce
IDB1, HPIN1, IDM1, MSISDN1: Data
pks1 : ServerPublicKey
sks1 : ServerSecretKey
InverseKeys = (pks1, sks1)
#Functions
symbolic passwd, pk, sk
#System
BANK(Bank,Server1,Merchant, Phone, IDB1,Challenge1,
pks1, HPIN1, IDM1, MSISDN1)
PHONE(Phone, Server1, Bank, IDB1, pks1, HPIN1,MSISDN1)
SERVER(Server1, Bank, Phone, Merchant, pks1, sks1)
MERCHANT(Merchant,Server1, Bank, IDB1,IDM1,TREF1)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Phone,Bank,Merchant,Mallory,
pk(Mallory), sk(Mallory)}
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